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FOREWORD
In this timely and realistic examination of social
media, two world-class British experts examine exactly, in the defense context, what social media is and
what it should and should not be used for in the future. In setting out their arguments, they define social
media in four distinctly different ways: first, they assess, perhaps self-evidently, that it is a media channel,
and actually differs little to newspapers and radio in
anything other than reach and immediacy; second,
they see it as an interactive medium that might have
potential for exerting influence, but only when accompanied by robust target audience analysis (TAA);
third, they see it as a means of establishing a dialogue
and communications within already well-established
networks and groups; and, finally, they see it as a realtime sensor network that may possibly provide the
first indication of globally important events—albeit
unsubstantiated and raw in its content and reporting. They also make a clear statement; the evidence
that social media, by itself, as a precursor to mass
behavior is not present. Social media, in the authors’
views, cannot predict behaviors with any reliability or
consistency.
Having considered each of these in the military
context, the authors then examine the military implications of social media. Here they address four questions: First, is social media a viable and effective messaging conduit? Second, what are the implications of
social media for information operations (IO) doctrine,
personnel, and operational security (OPSEC)? Third,
the authors ask if the United States has the necessary structures, training, and equipment in place to
effectively harness social media. Finally, the authors
ask how well our institutions are placed to train and
vii

educate military personnel—and specifically the most
senior personnel—in what social media can and
cannot achieve.
Social media, the authors write, is a disruptive, yet
innovative, technology that is poorly understood by
the military, and it does not sit well in current hierarchical military structures. In headquarters and operations rooms, globally, the Internet terminal is typically
the preserve of the public affairs officer (PAO). The
mixing of open source Internet-enabled IT systems
and classified military and governmental communication systems is fraught with difficulty—bureaucratic
and technological. If the military is to leverage the full
capability of social media, there will be many “sacred
cows” that will have to be slain. However, commanders, the authors conclude, should ignore them at their
own peril.
Throughout this Letort Paper, the authors draw
upon their vast IO experience gathered from multiple
global operations to present a fascinating and useable
insight into a phenomena that is not yet 15 years old.
			
			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
This Letort Paper seeks to answer some specific
questions on how the U.S. Army, and by extension its
allies, can best leverage social media, particularly on
operations. Are they a viable and effective messaging
conduit? Have they changed the information operations (IO) landscape? Does the United States have the
correct force structure, training, equipment, and technology to leverage social media? Finally, how can we
train our leaders to better understand and use social
media?
The impact of social media on the media environment has been widely recognized, as has the ability
of extremist and adversarial organizations to exploit
the media to publicize their cause, spread their propaganda, and recruit vulnerable individuals. Supporting
the growth of social media has been the phenomenal
global increase in mobile telephone usage, and much
of this increase is in areas where there are existing
conflicts or conflicts are highly likely.
However, the full implications of the mobile and
social media revolution are not yet fully understood.
Social media will increasingly have a direct impact on
virtually all aspects of military operations in the 21st
century. In doing so, social media will force significant changes to policy, doctrine, force structures, and
virtually all staff functions within operational units.
New training requirements and new approaches to
traditional operational challenges will be required.
All this will require a wider understanding of social
media and the realization that it is no longer an area
simply of concern to public affairs officers (PAO) and
possibly intelligence (INT).
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Although with new threats come new opportunities, and the interactive nature of social media in
particular means that it is potentially a very powerful
medium for IO, that potential needs to be recognized
before capabilities can be developed to respond to this
rapidly developing revolution.
There are four distinctly different applications of
social media; and understanding each, together with
its impact upon the Army, is critical to addressing the
various questions posed.
• Social media can be regarded primarily as a
media channel, just like radio, newspapers, and
television.
• In addition to this, social media can be seen as
an interactive medium for exerting influence.
• Importantly, social media is a way of communicating within an already established network
or networks.
• Finally, social media is a near real-time sensorto-sensor network.
There is a need for commanders, and in particular
operations and INT staff, to understand social media
and all its different functions, not simply its media
function, in order to understand its potential impact
on operations, and to incorporate that understanding
into their planning and operations.
The key recommendations include:
• A social media capacity needs to be built into
every level of command. In the real-time information environment created by social media,
operational commanders at every level will
need simultaneous and identical situational
awareness of unfolding events.
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• Social media is integral to the conduct of operations, not just a PAO or INT function. Thus, the
U.S. Army needs a custom-made doctrine and
an educational capacity to inform commanders
on its intelligent and safe use.
• In order to integrate social media into operations, each of the staff functions needs continuous access, at their desk, to the Internet.
• Social media must be integral to all exercises.
This needs the creation of a virtual social media
environment—i.e., a sandbox or simulation—to
add the social media space to training environments. This must be a space in which it is “safe
to fail.”
• Within headquarters, the responsibility for social media needs to be clearly articulated and
the posts resourced appropriately.
• U.S. Army and Department of Defense (DoD)
policy and doctrine must clarify a host of difficult issues relating to social media usage, in
particular its use in deception and Psychological Operations (PSYOPS).
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SOCIAL MEDIA—THE VITAL GROUND:
CAN WE HOLD IT?
INTRODUCTION
Once upon a time, there existed a world without
social media. In the ubiquitous information environment in which we now live, it seems incredible that
such a world was, in fact, no more than 12 years ago.
Between 2004 and 2014, all 22 of the world’s biggest
social media networks were developed and launched,
with the first, Facebook, on February 4, 2004.1 Supporting that growth has been the phenomenal global
increase in mobile telephone usage. While this was
initially driven by the consumerism of the global
“West,” today it would be a challenge to find a society
where there is no mobile phone usage.2 Much of the
rapid increase is concentrated in areas where there are
existing conflicts, or conflicts are highly likely, and as
a result, we believe that mobile phone usage, particularly when associated with social media, is likely to
have a significant impact upon the conduct and outcome of those conflicts.3 However, can we quantify
that outcome? Much seems to have been written about
social media: the apparently extraordinary recruiting
power of the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’s
(commonly referred to as ISIS) social media campaign
(of which we remain to be convinced); the apparent
“success” of Russia’s trolling (of which we are absolutely less convinced); and the way that social media
apparently triggered the Arab Spring (of which we are
absolutely not convinced at all).
It may actually be too late to undertake a nuanced
assessment of the challenge of social media from the
perspective of policy—many governments and mili-
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taries have apparently already decided that the social
media space is a battlefield and are already spending
millions on creating social media soldiers or “network
warriors” to engage in those online battles. Whether
that is money well spent is debatable, but regardless,
in this Letort Paper we seek to answer some specific
questions on how the U.S. Army, and by extension its
allies, can best leverage social media, particularly on
operations. Specifically, we will consider if social media is really a viable and effective messaging conduit;
secondly, we investigate if social media has changed
the information operations (IO) landscape; thirdly, we
will consider if the United States has the correct force
structure, training, equipment, and technology to leverage social media. Finally, we will consider how
we train and educate our leaders to better understand
and use social media.
Before addressing each of these areas, we need to
contextualize our thoughts with our observations of
what social media is, or can be, in the military context. We find four distinctly different applications of
social media, and understanding each, together with
its impact upon the Army, is critical to addressing the
various questions posed.
1. Social media, in our view, should be regarded
primarily as a media channel, just like radio,
newspapers, and television.
2. In addition to this, social media should be seen
as an interactive medium for exerting influence.
3. Importantly, social media is a way of communicating within an already established network
or networks.4
4. Finally, social media is a near real-time sensorto-sensor network.5
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Each of these observations needs to be explained in a
little more detail.
The first function, social media as a media channel, is perhaps what people most clearly understand.
The spread of social media has transformed the speed
with which incidents are reported, and in many cases,
events are now being reported through social media
as they are still unfolding.6 This has undoubtedly
changed the nature of news reporting and has shortened the response time available to government and
military leaders after major events. We need to caveat
this, however, with some historical context. This response time has been reducing throughout history
with the advent of new communications technologies—with steep changes at the introduction of significant innovations such as the post horse and telegraph networks—so this should not be regarded as
a new phenomenon. However, social media as a media channel has enabled policymakers to see a wider
range of viewpoints than ever before, including those
of the adversary. It has also created a dilemma: most
conventional news reporting follows certain standards of truth and accuracy. The British Broadcasting
Corporation (BBC), for example, will only report an
event as news if it has two independently verifiable
sources (unless a BBC correspondent is witnessing the
actual event).7 If it does not, the BBC will clearly state
that the report has yet to be verified. Such moral exactitude does not exist in social media, so policymakers are gaining a far wider view of an event, but the
accuracy of that view is highly debatable. While this
is a major challenge, the nature of the challenge is, in
general, well understood, especially by public affairs
professionals.8
Unlike conventional media, though, social media
allows individuals to interact with others in multiple
3

different ways and directions. It is this second function that enables social media to be considered as a
potentially powerful medium for influence. Much recent military and governmental investment in social
media has been in using it to spread counter-narratives in response to the all too frequently successful
use by extremist groups. The West has looked at the
use of social media by organizations such as ISIS and
concluded that this is a critical area whose importance
will only increase. We agree that this is an area of
growing importance; communities currently without
social media penetration can reasonably be expected
to, in time, exhibit the same characteristics of communities that already make use of it today. However,
there is also a very real danger in assuming if social
media says it is so, it is so. There is also a presumption
that the volume of social media postings is indicative
of interest. Again, we urge caution—volume can be
manufactured very easily.9 Overly focusing on this
area, while important, risks overlooking the other
functions of social media that we have identified in
this Letort Paper previously.
We believe that insufficient attention has been paid
to the nature of social media as a communications network per se. It is known that terrorist and insurgent
groups already use applications such as SnapChat and
WhatsApp for tactical communication, but this is just
the tip of the iceberg, because they are now increasingly being used by military and civilian groups of all
descriptions.10 For example, a colleague and European
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) officer
who was deployed to sub-Saharan Africa regularly
used WhatsApp to communicate with colleagues in
different European nations, seeking advice on operational issues. The officer explained that the app was
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almost instantaneous, that it could reach targeted
people whose advice was trusted, and was far faster
than any military information technology (IT) system,
which would not have been able to reach specialists of
different nationalities at all, let alone in the time-frame
that the data was needed. A second example is the
wave of immigrants making their journey to Europe.
A number of studies have now shown that WhatsApp,
in particular, is being used as a tool to improve the
immigrants’ situational awareness.11
Although messaging apps like these have been
seen as less secure than government communications
and, therefore, more open to interception, even this
may be changing. The recent court case between the
U.S. Government and Apple over the decryption of an
iPhone suggests that commercial security protocols
are becoming at least as strong as many governmental
ones.12 Whether less secure or not, they are all more
user-friendly and accessible than conventional classified systems. While the U.S.’s Secret Internet Protocol
Router Network (SIPR) and Non-classified Internet
Protocol Router (NIPR) network systems are relatively sophisticated (noting that it is very difficult for nonU.S. nationals to gain access), the United Kingdom’s
(UK) Defence Information Infrastructure (DII) system,
for example, is notorious for its slowness, its lack of
connectivity with others, and its questionable “user
friendliness.” We should, therefore, not be surprised
when digitally aware officers use their initiative and
the technology they are familiar with to address issues quickly and safely. It seems to us that in the future, social media platforms, often the same ones, will
inevitably be used for operational communication
by our people, by local civilian populations, and by
adversarial groups alike.
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The final function we would highlight is the ability to use a network of smartphones effectively as a
sensor network. A population equipped with smartphones and willing to communicate to others about
the events taking place in their area is able to generate
a picture of ongoing events in real time across the span
of that population. Through the use of techniques such
as crowd sourcing—the practice of obtaining information by soliciting contributions from a large group of
people on social media—civil society organizations
(CSOs) are already exploiting this capability in humanitarian crisis situations.13 To date, crowd sourcing
has been used to generate situational awareness for
humanitarian organizations in disaster zones, from
the aftermath of typhoons in the Philippines, to the
earthquake in Haiti, to major flooding in Australia.
In each case, an accurate picture of the situation was
built up virtually and almost entirely through social
media posts and updates across the area concerned.14
What social media cannot do yet, in our view, is
predict behavior with any reliability or consistency.
This latter finding will be the most contentious, not
least, as many commercial companies are actively
marketing their media monitoring tools as behavioral
predictors. Undeniably, while terrorists use the web
to communicate—particularly applications that do
not place their data sets in the public domain such as
WhatsApp—the evidence that social media, by itself,
is a precursor to mass behavior is simply not present.
As the U.S. Peace Institute concluded in a major report
on the Arab Spring: “New media. . . did not appear to
play a significant role in either in-country collective
action or regional diffusion during this period [emphasis added].” In any event, the Arab Spring, such
is the pace of social media development, is already of
limited relevance for assessing current capabilities.15
6

It would also be useful at this early stage to identify some of the constraints and challenges social media
poses. For example, social media is a disruptive, yet
innovative technology that does not sit well in current
hierarchical military structures. In headquarters and
operation rooms globally, the Internet terminal is typically the preserve of the public affairs officer (PAO).
The mixing of open source Internet-enabled IT systems
and classified military and governmental communication systems is fraught with difficulty—bureaucratic
and technological. If the military is to leverage the full
capability of social media, many sacred cows will have
to be slain. Social media is not just a public affairs or
strategic communication-messaging tool; it is already
a major source of intelligence, and will become more
important still in understanding and planning military operations. Commanders ignore it at their peril.
HOW DOES THE ARMY LEVERAGE SOCIAL
MEDIA?
How can the Army leverage social media for strategic messaging? First and foremost, the Army needs to
understand the changing dynamics and demographics of social media across the world and, in particular,
the way in which people now access information. The
world is in the middle of a so-called “mobile revolution,” and increasingly, the principal way to reach
external audiences worldwide is through social media via their mobile. In the context of the likely audiences in conflict environments, this trend is even more
pronounced, as these environments are often in less
developed countries where the population has previously had very limited access to the Internet.
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The evidence indicates that the acceptance of
data-enabled smartphones has been even faster than
previous revolutions in communications such as radio.16 Mobile data traffic has grown 4,000-fold over
the past 10 years, and the speed of this device acceptance continues to increase; global mobile data traffic
grew 74 percent in 2015.17 The world is also nearing
the so-called “peak device” point, as it is estimated
that more than half of all Internet traffic will originate
with non-personal computer devices by 2019.18 This
trend is predicted to continue, and mobile data traffic
is predicted to grow at a compound annual growth
rate (CAGR) of 53 percent from 2015 to 2020. By then,
it is estimated that there will be 11.6 billion mobileconnected devices, exceeding the world’s projected
population at that time (7.8 billion).19
Social media is already the primary use for the
data capability of smartphones. In 2015, there were
3.42 billion Internet users (equaling 46 percent global
penetration), but not that far behind, there were 2.31
billion social media users (31 percent global penetration).20 The impact of the mobile revolution is worldwide, but the areas that are most dramatically affected
by these changes, with the highest rates of smartphone
and Internet growth, are Africa, the Middle East, and
Central Asia, including many fragile states and areas
where conflict is ongoing or where the potential for
conflict exists.21 While television and radio remain
important sources of information, the growth of social media has seen it become an increasingly trusted
source, especially likely to be trusted by the youth
demographic.22
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In addition to accessing a range of news sources,
including both national and international media channels, social media enables access to local sources of
information such as bloggers and local websites, and
CSOs working in the local area. The news can cover
anything: the locations of current fighting, the state of
repair of power and water lines, the condition of roads
and the possibility of travel, the names of those killed
in a recent strike, food prices and locations, international news, and media statements made by politicians, activists, or military leaders.
Perhaps most importantly, social media enables
contacts with friends and family, traditionally the
most trusted sources for information in many societies, particularly in developing countries. In current
conflict zones such as Syria, communications within
such networks have been greatly enhanced by the use
of social media. In his description of the importance of
Facebook in Syria, blogger Ammar Halabi writes:
Browsing the Facebook feed has therefore [become] a
primary way to get news and commentary about the
whereabouts of friends and family, either inside or
outside of Syria. My connections have mentioned often
that browsing the ‘green dot’ that indicates that somebody is online on Facebook chat was a way to know
that they are doing OK [emphasis added].23

While Facebook, WhatsApp, and Twitter have
come to dominate across all demographics in many
countries where social media is in its infancy, the increasing maturity of the communications environment
in other countries has led to greater audience segmentation, because different social media platforms have
become more popular with different sections of the
population. In the UK for example, the average age of
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a Facebook user is increasing, and the majority of users are now in the 25 to 34 demographic, while applications such as Snapchat are primarily used by 18-24
year olds and Kik by an even younger demographic.24
This trend is only likely to continue and will increasingly allow better-targeted communications with specific audience segments.
With the continuing evolution of social media,
many countries are developing specific preferences
for social media applications divided on demographic, political, or even ethnic lines. For example, in Latvia most of the population use the Latvian “Draugiem” social media site, with limited penetration of the
primarily Russian social networking site VKontakte
(VK), suggesting a political division of social media
between those considering themselves to be Latvian
Latvians and those Latvians of Russian descent.25 Similarly, suspicions that Russia was using data from VK
to spy on Ukrainians resulted in an increased use of
Facebook by those opposed to Russian operations in
Ukraine.26
The differentiation of social media in different
countries also extends to specific uses. WhatsApp is
popular across the world, but primarily as a messaging app; it is frequently used as a free substitute for
texting. In Sudan, however, activists are using it to
share news and discussion.27 With the repressive government in Sudan monitoring other social media, such
as Facebook, activists prize WhatsApp for its security
and encryption, and through the use of messagegroups activists have adapted it to widely distribute
news.
The mobile revolution and phenomenal rise of social media have affected virtually every country in the
world, including countries assumed to lack any sig-
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nificant Internet penetration at all. In Afghanistan, for
example, the percentage of population with access to
the Internet has risen to more than 12 percent in a few
short years, and that percentage continues to rise at a
rapid pace. It now has over 4 million Internet users,
of whom 2.6 million are on Facebook.28 Its increasing
importance was highlighted in December 2015, when
the deputy governor of the Helmand province sent an
open letter to the President pleading for more assistance in the province—by means of a Facebook update.29 Paradoxically, President Erdoğan, no lover of
social media in Turkey, found it unexpectedly useful
to communicate to his people in the attempted July
2016 coup.30 In short, in the near future there is no potential conflict area in the world that will not be significantly impacted by the Internet and social media.
Collectively these trends clearly indicate that careful target audience analysis (TAA) of the social media environment needs to be carried out to determine
what channels to use. They also suggest that targeted
messaging to specific demographics is increasingly
feasible. However, the issue of credibility acts as a major constraint. Recent years have seen a reduction in
the assessed trustworthiness of government communications, particularly for certain demographics such
as youth and minority groups.31 It is these groups that
are frequently key audiences for strategic messaging.
Where the Army is attempting to communicate, the
interactive nature of social media can provide better
ways of engaging audiences, particularly younger audiences, but the emphasis needs to be on creating an
informal, open, and interactive approach, along with
utilizing credible non-government voices wherever
possible.
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In addressing the question of how the Army leverages social media, the primary lesson is that the Army
needs to have a better understanding of its audiences,
and their use of social media, than it does at present.
Both authors have worked within the UK, U.S., and
coalition commands and have shared discussions
with uniformed colleagues of all nationalities. The
paucity of social media understanding and access has
been a recurring theme of debate. What this means,
in practice, is allowing commanders and planners a
deeper and broader understanding of the specific demographics and usage of social media in their respective regions of interest. This may seem a non sequitur,
but our experience is that many senior, and certainly
older, people tend not to understand the details of social media, employing instead a “one size fits all” approach. Secondly, the Army needs to understand usage patterns. Again, this is largely a function of TAA;
it is no good placing all of the output on Facebook if
the majority of users are on VK. Inherently, this means
that the Army needs strong linguistic skills in order
to understand and seamlessly slip into these social
media outlets.
Thirdly, the Army needs to have a good understanding of the political and social divisions that characterize social media usage. In Latvia, for example, we
found that many senior people made the assumption
that Russian-speaking Latvians accessed only Russian
organic media. This was simply not the case, and very
small, but nonetheless influential, organic Latvian
Russian websites carried a far greater influence than
originally assumed.32
Finally, social media has become ubiquitous, but
it is possible to mistake volume for precision. With so
much data available, it is increasingly important to
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find the right media, at the right time, and for the right
audience, and this requires detailed research. A failure to understand any one of these points will make
social media exploitation irrelevant and potentially
misleading.
SOCIAL MEDIA AND INFORMATION
OPERATIONS (IO)
The second question we wish to address is how
social media has changed the IO landscape. Joint Publication (JP) 3-13, Information Operations defines IO:
as the integrated employment, during military operations, of Information Related Capabilities (IRC) in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt,
corrupt, or usurp the decision making of adversaries
and potential adversaries while protecting our own.33

Given the impact on the information environment and
therefore IRCs, undoubtedly, the answer to this is yes.
First and foremost, the ubiquity of social media
has made it far easier for hostile elements to communicate directly with American audiences. Although
the effectiveness of ISIS’s online recruiting campaign
is the subject of some conjecture—with some arguing
that social media simply serves as a catalyst for other
deeper behavioral drivers such as marginalization,
poor life chances, or criminality—it is clear that imagery from the frontline, often of the most gruesome
and violent nature, is immediately available to a population, which may or may not be directly influenced
by it. Indeed, many argue that it is primarily through
social media that extremist groups in the Middle East
and Africa have been able to radicalize and recruit
volunteers, in particular, to either conduct attacks in
13

their own countries, or to travel to conflict areas and
join the extremist organizations directly. One of the
earliest exploiters of social media in this way was Al
Shabbab in Somalia, whose delivery of high-quality
videos through a range of platforms was at the time
unprecedented.34 ISIS later adopted and developed Al
Shabbab’s techniques.
It is believed that, so far, as many as 30,000 foreign fighters have traveled into Syria to take part in
the conflict there, from countries all over the world.
The reasons why they have traveled vary widely, with
research showing that common motivations include
excitement and adventure, peer pressure, and a search
for identity. We argue that social media on its own is
rarely the root cause; however, it facilitates radicalization and allows users to connect with ISIS recruiters
as well as other radicalized individuals. Social media
also allows for the creation of filtered information environments where the group dynamic can be a powerful radicalizing force.35
The use of social media by Russia in its ongoing
operations in Eastern Ukraine is well known, and
numerous papers have discussed it in detail.36 While
Russian operations in Crimea have received many
internal Russian plaudits, and are the subject of numerous Russian military papers and studies, this is
not a characteristic of operations in Eastern Ukraine.
Russia’s efforts there have been far less successful,
partly due to being less planned and more reactive to
events on the ground, but also arguably because it is
significantly less disciplined. This is particularly the
case in social media where the “firehose of nonsense
and lies,” a constant stream of trolling and misinformation, has been turned on, but seemingly with little
effect other than for the West to constantly now ques-
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tion the veracity of any Russian communication. If
it has been successful, it has been with the domestic
Russian audience, which now is completely isolated
from any competing narrative, giving the lie to the oftstated concept of a global media space.
Russian operations in Donbass have also illustrated that social media usage can increasingly provide critical evidence of the reality of a situation in a
combat environment. It is the ongoing position of the
Russian government that Russian troops are not present in Eastern Ukraine. In common with other young
people, globally, Russian troops are reminded to use
social media to communicate with their loved ones
and also with each other. Organizations such as Bellingcat have used this to track individual soldiers and
the Russian units that command them. This has been
particularly effective in building the case for Russian
involvement in the shooting down of a Malaysian
airliner.37
These are also risks that our own military could
equally face. In a recent exercise presented at the
NATO school in Oberammergau, one of this Letort
Paper’s authors demonstrated how the key personnel
of a Royal Navy warship, their families, their social
groups, their personal addresses, and their children’s
schools could all be easily identified from social media. In one case, the home address of a ship’s Principal
Warfare Officer was quickly found because he had applied for local authority planning permission, which
is placed online in the UK, to extend his house. Possessing an unusual surname, he was easy enough to
locate.38 This type of information is almost impossible
to protect and yet relatively easy to access using social
media analysis tools. The Royal Navy ship in question
may be one of the most powerful warships afloat, but
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without its key personnel present and focused on their
tasks, it would have little operational utility. In a conflict environment, it would be naïve to think that our
adversaries would not use this information, proactively, to their operational advantage. An integral part of
Western IO doctrine is operational security (OPSEC);
as well as regarding social media as an offensive operational tool, the Army needs to think very carefully
about defensive measures in the social media domain.
While we may be able to control our soldiers, controlling the use of social media by the soldiers’ families
will be significantly harder, if not impossible; and yet,
through those very innocent conduits, it will be possible to directly target military personnel.
The continuing evolution of social media has
undoubtedly resulted in areas of opportunity for
friendly force IO as well. The nature of the Internet
and social media in particular has effectively removed
geographic barriers to communication with audiences
across the world. Social media has none of the range
or access limitations of radio or television. All that is
required virtually anywhere in the world is Internet
access. In addition, little infrastructure or resources
are required to generate product. In many cases, little
training has been required or conducted with adversarial groups rapidly learning “on the job.” One unintended consequence of this accessibility of social
media is that, whereas previous U.S. IO activity using
conventional media has been able to be specifically
targeted against adversarial groups or hostile governments, the use of social media in theory allows the
U.S. home audience to access the same material. U.S.
legislation states that U.S. forces cannot conduct IO
against the U.S. population; however, clearly targeted
material, even if able to be seen by a U.S. audience,

16

would not violate this condition.39 At the tactical level,
we have seen how our adversaries have operationalized social media particularly in deceptive operations.
For example, during the battle for Deir ez-Zour in
Syria in 2014, between ISIS and al-Nusra, fake videos
were released onto YouTube purporting to be tribal
elders switching allegiance to ISIS.40 A small number
of defection videos were also released—that may have
been false—causing al-Nusra to make public statements that they were not true, which then confused
the rather sparse and poorly connected communities
caught up in the fighting.
Deception, of course, is not new to the battlefield;
but its dissemination on social media is, and it brings
with it difficulties of our own making. Can social media, for example, be used in a tactical deception operation? Imagine simulating the movement of a patrol
through the generation of social media reports of its
progress. Under current interpretations of social media, to do so would be classified as “Black Psychological Operations (PSYOPS),” because it would be
doctrinally categorized as a false report emanating
from a false source. Both national and NATO Alliance
doctrine specifically articulate that PSYOPS products
should be truthful and attributable. Therefore, in our
consideration of how the Army may leverage social
media, a further area that needs to be considered is
both doctrine and rules of engagement. It is perhaps
worth noting that neither Operation FORTITUDE,
the Second World War Allies’ successful attempts to
deceive the Nazis from knowing the location of the
D-Day landings, nor Operation RHINO, General Norman Schwartzkopf’s deception plan in the 1991 Gulf
War, would be likely to succeed today given the omnipresence of social media. After all, the world first
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learned of the operation to kill Osama Bin Laden,
while it was being undertaken, by a tweet from Pakistani IT consultant Sohaib Athar, who informed the
world: “Helicopter hovering above Abbottabad at
1AM (is a rare event).”41 Today, that might have been
a live video feed from Periscope.
In fact, the whole issue of doctrine is problematic, because most of the doctrine that currently exists
was written before the explosion in social media, or it
only touched upon it very lightly or obliquely. Take
for example the current official U.S. Army document
that deals with social media: a handbook that was designed for PAO offices and primarily discusses social
media in the context of engagement over news issues,
rather than how it can be used on operations.42
The UK Army Doctrine Publication (ADP), Operations, describes itself as:
the British Army capstone doctrine containing the enduring philosophy and principles for our approach to
operations reflecting the rapidly involving dynamics
of the contemporary operating environment.

It contains not one single reference to social media.43
Similarly, the U.S. Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the
Armed Forces of the United States, describes itself as:
“the capstone joint doctrine publication . . . for unified action by the Armed Forces of the United States”;
yet, across some 172-pages, there is but one single
mention of social media.44 We should not really be
surprised at this; doctrine, after all, takes a considerable amount of time to draft, be approved, and then
published—all the more so in large and bureaucratic
international organizations, such as NATO, where it
inevitably becomes a reflection of the lowest common
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denominator of agreement between multiple member
states. However, this does highlight the reality that
the pace of technological and social change with social media is taking place faster than we can articulate
in our military publications. This is, therefore, a significant challenge for the Army. How far do we wish
as subordinates to innovate and take risk in a highly
dynamic information environment? To succeed in future conflicts we may need to ask some very difficult
questions about rules of engagement, legality, truthfulness, attribution, and a host of subsidiary issues,
because future conflicts will be played out in a very
different information environment.
It would be timely to consider the developments
made by China in this particular area. In 2003, the
Chinese Communist Party Central Committee signed
off on a new concept called Three Warfares. They believed that in the future, nuclear arms would be unusable and that conventional kinetic options would
be preferred in only a tiny number of possible future
conflicts, and even then, outcomes would be problematic. Three Warfares is the adoption of a third type of
warfare, where PSYOPS, media manipulation, and
legal warfare are the mainstays of Chinese strategy.
We have seen this played out in key areas of Chinese
foreign policy in the present-day, for example, with
the physical creation of new islands in disputed areas
of the South China Sea that has provided China with
opportunities to “legally” extend its territorial boundaries. In 2015, China created a strategic support force
commanded by a four-star general. Within this force,
China placed both its defensive and offensive cyber
PSYOPS and media operations commands.
What we might presume from this is that both
Russia and China are putting great emphasis on
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operationalizing emerging technologies such as social
media. This does not yet appear to be the case for the
U.S. Army, and we believe there are a number of key
areas that need to be investigated.
Force Structures, Training & Education,
and Equipment.
Given the nature and pace of social media development, it is clear to us that the U.S. Army must address three distinct issues: Force Structures; Training
and Education; and Equipment. This Letort Paper and
its two English authors would not propose to recommend specific force structures, but we could generically recommend that a social media capacity needs to
be built into every level of command. In the real-time
information environment created by social media,
operational commanders at every level will need simultaneous and identical situational awareness of unfolding events. It is preposterous to presume that this
increasingly vital area should somehow reside only
with the PAO and Intelligence (INT); it must be central to operations and planning. Today, it is entirely
normal to have a live unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)
feed into the Force Operations room; in the future, social media feeds should be similarly entirely normal.
Equipment. There is a critical need to integrate the
Internet into operational headquarters at all levels of
command, in particular mobile and tactical headquarters.45 Without broad access across the staff functions,
not just IO, it will not be possible to properly address a
number of the issues identified earlier. While there are
technical and security issues with ensuring Internet
access within headquarters and tactical headquarters
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in particular, overall the issue is more about integrating existing technology rather than the challenge of
developing new technology.
Analytical software tools. A great deal of emphasis
has been placed on the development of analytical software for social media analysis. In the context of IO,
both their importance and their limitations need to be
properly recognized. There are now large numbers
of commercial applications that scrape open source
media and provide all kinds of metrics. Such analysis
can be very useful, but there is an urgent need to understand the different requirements that different staff
functions might have. Both INT and PAO functions
and requirements are relatively well understood, but
the requirements for others, including both Operations and IO are less clear.
Social media needs to be considered in terms other
than simply as a media channel, and as a result operational headquarters at all levels require a monitoring
function that reflects this. A social media feed, suitably filtered and managed appropriately for the level
of headquarters, needs to be available to the INT staff
function and sufficiently integrated with the Operations, IO, and PAO staff functions. This function will
need to be capable of live monitoring, but depending
on the level of headquarters may only need limited
analysis capability, as depth analysis of social media
can be conducted with reachback capabilities. Responsibilities for the different staff functions need to
be clarified and manpower changes may be required
as a result of the need for new social media roles
within headquarters and supporting IO and PSYOPS
components.
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For example, in the future it is highly likely that if
deployed troops encounter civil disobedience, including demonstrations and riots, these will be directed
and coordinated through social media in real time,
possibly also with multiple sources broadcasting the
events on live streaming video directly onto the Internet. Under these circumstances, a capability for the
operations staff to monitor events on social media directly would be required in the same way that a UAV
feed can be monitored directly when necessary. This
is not revolutionary, it is evolutionary; and in essence,
this is no different to the existing practice of monitoring radio communications, already updated in recent
operational contexts to the real-time provision of tactical information by listening in to Integrated Communications Security (ICOM) chatter. As those involved
in such civil disobedience would be a key audience for
IO, there is also both a monitoring implication and an
IO opportunity for intervention, which implies that IO
needs a significant deployable social media broadcast
capability that has a capacity to operate in real time as
well as a longer-term engagement capacity.
Effective and timely communication in a rising
number of areas across the world will require engagement via social media as they increasingly come to
dominate how local audiences communicate and receive information. IO and PSYOPS capabilities will
need sufficient capability to broadcast using different
social media platforms. Specific levels of capacity will
require a more detailed analysis of the likely tasks
at each level of command, and there is also a need
to consider different forms of reachback capability.
Nevertheless, in line with current U.S. doctrine, commanders will need to retain some level of capability at
different levels of command to be able to utilize IO in
direct support of their own operations.
22

Training and Education. We believe there exists a
requirement for all personnel to be better educated
in terms of understanding the full range of functions
that social media can be used for; in particular, dispelling the myth that only PAO or INT need be aware
of or understand social media. This basic education
level would also include a clear understanding of the
OPSEC risk to U.S. forces that social media represents.
There is a need for commanders, and in particular operations and INT staff, to understand social media and
its different functions, not simply its media function,
in order to understand its potential impact on operations and to incorporate that understanding into their
planning and operations. Commanders do not need
specialist social media knowledge, but they do need
sufficient knowledge to understand its importance,
as well as how the different stakeholders in conflict
environments are likely to employ it. They also need
to have an understanding of the analytical techniques
that can be used on social media data and the capabilities and limitations of that analysis.
Specialist IO personnel will need to have a greater
depth of understanding of social media, of its functions, and of the psychology underpinning human
behavior online. They also need an understanding of
the different types of analysis that can be conducted
on social media data and the relative value of that
analysis.
IO social media analysts will increasingly be required. The huge increase in social media use presents
increasing opportunities to mine data-rich information
in a conflict environment and collect raw intelligence
on different actors and stakeholders within them. This
has the potential to generate detailed assessments and
can offer deep insights into audience motivations, atti-
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tudes, and behaviors. In addition to requiring specialist analytical skills, these analysts need to be able to
integrate such information with other target audience
data and intelligence to best support IO.
In the UK, the use of competency frameworks has
become increasingly useful in defining who needs to
know what and to what detail. We would suggest a
competency framework for social media (see Table 1).
Competency

Audience

Awareness
Understand the threats and opportunities, utility and
constraints of social media.

All

Working Familiarity
Can access social media for analysis purposes and has a
deeper understanding of its utility and place in intelligence
collection and operational planning.

G2-G5

Practitioner
Can access social media for analysis and influence
purposes and has a deep understanding of its utility and
intelligence collection and operational planning.

PAO/ INT/ IO

Expert
Takes primary responsibility for all aspects of social media
usage.

IO

Table 1. Competency Framework for Social Media.
Technology. The technical challenges involved in
integrating Internet access with classified systems
center on the security challenges of doing so, rather
than the development of new technology. In contrast, many of the technologies involved in the area
of big data analysis are new and emerging, with some
important areas such as sentiment analysis still in a
relatively early stage of their development.46 Further
developments in these areas will only increase the
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value and importance of the analysis of social media
in conflict environments and reinforce the need for
such analysis to be provided in a timely manner to operational commanders at all levels. Finally, language
translation technology continues to evolve, and it increasingly will enable operators to utilize social media
in a multi-language environment.47
CONCLUSION
The impact of social media on the media environment has been widely recognized; as has the ability
of extremist and adversarial organizations to exploit
social media to publicize their cause, spread their
propaganda, and recruit vulnerable individuals.
However, the full implications of the mobile and social media revolution are not yet fully understood,
and they extend far beyond these areas. Social media
will increasingly have a direct impact on virtually
all aspects of military operations in the 21st century,
through all four of the different applications of social
media we have described. In doing so, social media
will force significant changes to policy, doctrine, force
structures, and virtually all staff functions within operational units. Social media will also necessitate new
training requirements and new approaches to traditional operational challenges. All this will require a
wider understanding of the full impact of social media
and the realization that it is no longer an area simply
of concern to PAO and possibly INT.
Although, with new threats come new opportunities, and the interactive nature of social media in
particular means that it is potentially a very powerful
medium for IO, if that potential is recognized and capabilities can be developed to respond to this rapidly
developing revolution.
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POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
In addition to the general recommendations above,
we make the following specific proposals:
1. Social media is integral to the conduct of operations, not just a PAO or INT function. Thus, the
U.S. Army needs a custom-made doctrine and
an educational capacity to inform commanders
on its intelligent and safe use.
2. In order to integrate social media into operations, each of the staff functions needs continuous access to the Internet at their desk.
3. Social media must be integral to all exercises.
This needs the creation of a virtual social media
environment—i.e., a sandbox or simulation—to
add the social media space to training environments. This must be a space in which it is “safe
to fail.”
4. There is a need for commanders, in general,
and operations and INT staff, in particular,
to understand social media and its different
functions, not limited to media use, and how
to incorporate it into the planning cycle. All
staff functions need training and education,
possibly using a competency framework.
5. Within headquarters, the responsibility for social media needs to be clearly articulated and
the posts resourced appropriately.
6. U.S. Army and Department of Defense (DoD)
policy and doctrine must clarify a host of difficult issues relating to social media usage and,
in particular, its use in deception and PSYOPS.

26

ENDNOTES
1. “Most famous social network sites worldwide as of January
2017, ranked by number of active users (in millions),” Statista.com,
January 2017, available from www.statista.com/statistics/272014/
globalsocialnetworks-ranked-by-number-of-users/.
2. Jacob Poushter, “Smartphone Ownership and Internet Usage Continues to Climb in Emerging Economies: But advanced
economies still have higher rates of technology use,” Global Technology Report, Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, February
22, 2016, available from www.pewglobal.org/2016/02/22/smartphone-ownership-and-internet-usage-continues-to-climb-in-emergingeconomies/, accessed February 23, 2016.
3. “Cisco Visual Networking Index: Global Mobile Data Traffic Forecast Update, 2015–2020,” White Paper, San Jose, CA: Cisco
Systems, Incorporated, updated June 1, 2016.
4. Serene Assir, “Facebook, WhatsApp and Viber light way to
Europe for Syrian refugees,” The Times of Israel, August 19, 2015,
available from www.timesofisrael.com/facebook-whatsapp-and-viberlight-way-to-europe-for-syrian-refugees/.
5. Annie Shiel, “Conflict Crowdsourcing: Harnessing the
Power of Crowdsourcing for Organizations Working in Conflict
and the Potential for a Crowd Sourced Portal for Conflict-Related
Information,” Undergraduate Honours Thesis, Montréal, Québec,
CA: McGill University, December 3, 2013.
6. Jenny Hauser, “Speed in Context: Real-time News Reporting and Social Media,” Paper Presented at the European Journalism Training Association Conference held at the Dublin Institute
of Technology, School of Media, on October 24, 2014.
7. The British Broadcasting Corporation’s (BBC) Editorial
Guidelines, state that:
[the BBC will] gather material using first hand sources
wherever possible, check and cross check facts, validate
the authenticity of documentary evidence and digital material, corroborate claims and allegations made by contribu-

27

tors wherever possible. In news and current affairs content,
achieving due accuracy is more important than speed.

British Broadcasting Corporation, Editorial Guidelines, London,
UK: British Broadcasting Corporation, 2017, available from www.
bbc.co.uk/editorialguidelines/guidelines/accuracy.
8. The main U.S. Army official publication that refers to social media is U.S. Department of the Army, The United States
Army Social Media Handbook, Washington, DC: U.S. Army, Office
of the Chief of Public Affairs, Online and Social Media Division,
April 2016, available from https://www.army.mil/e2/rv5_downloads/
socialmedia/army_social_media_handbook.pdf, which does so in the
context of public affairs.
9. For example, one has only to look at the volume of information created online by the Internet Research Agency based at
55 Savushkina Street, St. Petersburg, Russia in support of events
such as the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 (MH17).
10. Associated Press (AP), “Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp
helping ISIS, U.K. spy alleges,” CBC News, November 4, 2014,
available from www.cbc.ca/news/world/facebook-twitter-whatsapphelping-isis-u-k-spy-alleges-1.2822890.
11. Megan Specia, “WhatsApp offers lifeline for Syrian
refugees on journey across Europe,” Mashable, July 3, 2015,
available from mashable.com/2015/07/03/syrians-europe-whatsapprefugees/#ITbIBHPBFOq8.
12. Alina Selyukh and Camila Domonoske, “The Apple-FBI
Debate Over Encryption: Apple, The FBI And iPhone Encryption:
A Look At What’s At Stake,” The Two-Way: Breaking News From
NPR, National Public Radio (NPR), February 17, 2016, available
from www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/02/17/467096705/applethe-fbi-and-iphone-encryption-a-look-at-whats-at-stake.
13. Russ Linden, “The Life-Saving Power of Crowdsourcing,”
Governing: The States and Localities, Management Insights, January 23, 2013, available from www.governing.com/columns/mgmt-insights/col-crowdwourcing-ushahidi-saving-lives-haiti-earthquake.html.

28

14. Ibid.
15. Sean Aday, Henry Farrell, Marc Lynch, John Sides, and
Deen Freelon, “Blogs and Bullets II: New Media and Conflict After the Arab Spring,” Peaceworks, No. 80, Washington, DC: United
States Institute of Peace, July 2012, available from www.usip.org/
publications/blogs-and-bullets-ii-new-media-and-conflict-after-thearab-spring.
16. Mark P. Mills, “The Mobile Revolution Has Only Just
Begun,” Forbes, January 19, 2015, available from www.forbes.com/
sites/markpmills/2015/01/19/the-mobile-revolution-has-only-justbegun/#7e481fd9904c.
17. “Cisco Visual Networking Index.”
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Simon Kemp, “Digital in 2016,” Special Reports, Singapore: We Are Social Limited, January 27, 2016, available from
wearesocial.com/uk/special-reports/digital-in-2016.
21. Ibid.
22. Damian Radcliffe, “Survey: Arab Youth consume less
news and trust social media as a news source,” Knowledge Bridge,
June 27, 2013, available from www.kbridge.org/en/arab-youth-areconsuming-less-news-and-increasingly-trust-social-media-as-a-newssource/.
23. Ammar Halabi, “The use of social media in Syria,” Social Informatics Blog, April 24, 2014, available from https://
socialinfoblog.wordpress.com/2014/04/.
24. Mark Hoelzel, “Update: A breakdown of the demographics for each of the different social networks,” Business Insider UK,
June 29, 2015, available from uk.businessinsider.com/update-a-breakdown-of-the-demographics-for-each-of-the-different-social-networks2015-6?r=US&IR=T; Verto Analytics, “The Demographics of Social Media Properties: Looking Beyond Downloads,” Consumer
Insights, October 21, 2015, available from www.vertoanalytics.
29

com/2015/10/the-demographics-of-social-media-properties-looking-beyond-downloads/, accessed June 1, 2016.
25. “Draugiem,” crunchbase.com, n.d., available from www.
crunchbase.com/company/draugiem-2, accessed June 1, 2016; “Top
sites in Latvia,” Alexa.com, n.d., available from www.alexa.com/
topsites/countries/LV, accessed June 1, 2016; A target audience
analysis (TAA) was undertaken by the London, UK-based company, Strategic Communication Laboratories Limited in 2015.
26. Carol Matlack, “The Kremlin Tried to Use VKontakte—
Russia’s Facebook—to Spy on Ukrainians,” Bloomberg Businessweek, April 17, 2014.
27. Khalid Albaih, “How WhatsApp is fuelling a ‘sharing
revolution’ in Sudan,” The Guardian, October 15, 2015, available from www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/15/sudan-whatsappsharing-revolution.
28. Internet World Stats website, “Asia: Asia Marketing Research, Internet Usage, Population Statistics and Facebook Information,” Afghanistan, last updated February 16, 2017, available
from www.internetworldstats.com/asia.htm#af.
29. Mirwais Khan, “Helmand governor takes to Facebook to
warn Afghan president of Taliban threat,” Independent, December
20, 2015, available from www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/
helmand-governors-taliban-warning-on-facebook-a6780846.html.
30. Sam Schechner, “Erdogan Embraces Social Media to Repel
Coup Attempt in U-Turn,” The Wall Street Journal, July 17, 2016,
available from https://www.wsj.com/articles/erdogan-embraces-socialmedia-to-repel-coup-attempt-in-u-turn-1468760698.
31. Greg Miller, “National Security: Panel casts doubt on U.S.
propaganda efforts against ISIS,” The Washington Post, December 2, 2015, available from https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
national-security/panel-casts-doubt-on-us-propaganda-efforts-againstisis/2015/12/02/ab7f9a14-9851-11e5-94f0-9eeaff906ef3_story.html.
32. Target audience analysis (TAA) was undertaken by London, UK-based company, Strategic Communication Laboratories
Limited in 2015.
30

33. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Information Operations, Joint
Publication 3-13, Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff,
November 27, 2012, Incorp. Change 1, November 20, 2014.
34. Will Oremus, “Twitter of Terror: Somalia’s al-Shabaab
unveils a new social media strategy for militants,” Slate, December 23, 2011, available from www.slate.com/articles/technology/
technocracy/2011/12/al_shabaab_twitter_a_somali_militant_group_
unveils_a_new_social_media_strategy_for_terrorists_.html.
35. Research interview conducted by the authors with Hanif
Qadir, Chief Executive Officer of The Active Change Foundation
on May 16, 2016.
36. For example, see North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) Centre of Excellence Strategic Communications Centre
of Excellence, Framing of the Ukraine–Russia Conflict in Online and
Social Media, Riga: North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
Centre of Excellence Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, May 2016, available from www.stratcomcoe.org/framingukraine-russia-conflict-online-and-social-media.
37. Daniel Romein, “MH17—Potential Suspects and Witnesses from the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade: A Bellingcat Investigation,” Bellingcat.com, February 23, 2016, available from https://
www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2016/02/23/53rd-report-en/.
38. “Using Social Media for Operational Effect,” A lesson
delivered to the NATO School Oberammergau Senior Officer’s
Information Operations Course in May 2016.
39. The United States Information and Educational Exchange Act
of 1948, Public Law 80-402, Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1948, popularly referred to as the Smith–Mundt
Act, specifies the terms in which the U.S. Government can engage
global audiences.
40. Valerie Szybala, “The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham
and the ‘Cleansing’ of Deir ez-Zour,” Backgrounder, Washington,
DC: Institute for the Study of War, May 14, 2014, available from
www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/islamic-state-iraq-and-alsham-and-%E2%80%9Ccleansing%E2%80%9D-deir-ez-zour.

31

41. Sohaib Athar (@ReallyVirtual), “Helicopter hovering above
Abbottabad at 1AM (is a rare event),” May 1, 2011, 12:58 p.m.,
tweet, available from https://twitter.com/ReallyVirtual?lang=en-gb.
42. U.S. Department of the Army.
43. UK Ministry of Defence (MOD), Operations, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP), Shrivenham, UK: Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, Ministry of Defence, November 2010.
44. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of
the United States, Joint Publication 1, Washington, DC: U.S. Joint
Chiefs of Staff, March 25, 2013, pp. i., I-12.
45. From our joint experience of operational headquarters,
we know this to be the case; however, one may argue that while
there is no doctrine that tackles this issue there is no incentive to
remedy this situation. Our experience suggests that commanders
will continue to view social media purely as a potential breach of
operational security (OPSEC) and, therefore, limit its use as much
as possible.
46. Matthew Mooney, “Facebook Reactions: The Future for
Sentiment Analysis,” Isitsweet.wordpress.com, November 17,
2015.
47. Quentin Hardy, “Language Translation Tech Starts to Deliver on Its Promise,” Bits, blog of The New York Times, January
11, 2015, available from https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/01/11/
language-translation-tech-starting-to-deliver-on-its-promise/?_r=0.

32

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE
Major General William E. Rapp
Commandant
*****
STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE
and
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS
Director
Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.
Director of Research
Dr. Steven K. Metz
Authors
Mr. Ian Tunnicliffe
Dr. Steve Tatham
Editor for Production
Dr. James G. Pierce
Publications Assistant
Ms. Denise J. Kersting
*****
Composition
Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil

This Publication

SSI Website

USAWC Website

